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In this Article, the author analyzes the notice require-
ments under government construction contracts in regard
to discrepancies, changes, changed conditions, time exten-
sions, and appeals from contracting officers' decisions. He
concludes that although some of these requirements have
been "watered down" considerably, a contractor's diligent
compliance with the specified requirements not only best
protects his contract rights but also does not prove unduly
burdensome.
John J. Buford*
PROBABLY the most frequently quoted statement of the
Supreme Court of the United States concerning the loss of a claimant's
substantive rights for failure to observe a procedural requirement im-
posed by the federal government is: "Men must turn square comers
when they deal with the Government." However, in the field of
government contracts, certainly most observers would agree that
since Mr. Justice Holmes penned these words, the comers have been
worn a little smooth, if not substantially rounded.
Of course the hard core of case law in government contracts is
comprised of the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Claims, but the handling of the great majority of contract disputes
is done by the various government contract appeals boards created
by administrative agencies. Unique practical problems make it espe-
cially difficult to predict the disposition of a particular case before
an appeals board. In matters of procedure, as well as in cases in-
volving substantive problems, the practitioner in this field must rec-
ognize that the doctrine of stare decisis is not so firmly rooted as in
the court systems. This becomes more easily understandable when
* Attorney, United States Army Corps of Engineers. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of either the Corps of
Engineers, the Department of the Army, or the Defense Department.
1. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
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one realizes that contract disputes arising under similar documents
are being resolved daily by at least seven major contract appeals
boards,2 none of which is bound by the precedents established by
the others.
Furthermore, both between agencies and within the same board,
there are voids created by the lack of a truly comprehensive case re-
porting and digest system at the appeals board level. Some boards
do not publicly disseminate their decisions. Even at the court level,
the rapid expansion of this field of law has out-stripped the existing
digest and encyclopedia systems. Overhaul of the present systems,
including a substantial enlargement of the categorization, would be
of immeasurable service not only to the lawyer in private practice
and to his clients, but also to the various boards and government
lawyers advising contracting officers; such an overhaul is warranted
by the expanded activity in this important field of law.
Although government contractors who are confronted with the
consequence of a failure to observe some procedural requirement
often complain that the government has taken unfair advantage of
them, procedural compliance with government contracts is actually
less burdensome and complicated than is often the case when one
deals with the government in other matters. In contrast to the copi-
ous volumes of published regulations of some bureaus and agencies,
the source of practically all procedural demands on a government
contractor is the contract document itself. Furthermore, the obliga-
tions are not subject to change during performance of the contract,
having been established by agreement of the parties at the time of
contracting. And since these requirements are substantially logical
and are based upon the practical necessities of the situation, they
provide a framework for an orderly disposition of the parties' obli-
gations and rights during the contract period. One should not over-
look that the contract imposes procedural requirements on the
government as well as on the contractor and that even when the
burden is on the contractor, he often benefits from his compliance.
This is particularly true of the various requirements for notice.
Basically, a contractor protects his substantive rights under a gov-
ernment contract by giving notice. Although the relatively few
notice requirements are simply stated in the Construction Contract,
Standard Form 23A,3 many contractors are lax in complying with
2. The seven major contract appeals boards are as follows: The Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (with Army, Navy and Air Force panels); the contract
appeals boards of the Department of the Interior, the General Services Administra-
tion, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Veterans Administration, the
Atomic Energy Commission; and the recently created board of the Post Office
Department.
3. Contractors should be cautioned that the particular bureau or agency will
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them. A contractor's failure to give timely notice may result in his
loss of a right which otherwise would have been preserved and al-
most certainly will make the contracting officer or the appeals board
unsympathetic, or even antagonistic, toward him. This Article
analyzes the notice requirements in regard to contract discrepancies,
contract changes, changed conditions, time extensions, and appeals
from contracting officers' decisions.
I. DiscusPANciEs
If the contractor should detect a discrepancy in the figures or the
wording of the drawings or specifications, he is required to submit
the matter promptly to the contracting officer for a determination
of how the work shall be performed. Should he proceed to make his
own adjustment without first having secured the contracting officer's
written determination, his action will have been at his own risk and
expense.4 The requirement is not that the contractor discover dis-
crepancies but only that if he has knowledge of one, he must notify
the contracting officer. In the case of conflicting provisions particu-
larly, contractors will often proceed with the work without first
securing a determination by the contracting officer as to which of
the conflicting provisions should be followed. Later, the contractor
might contend that the construction actually performed was in
excess of the contract requirements (which often may be legally
correct, consistent with the rule that when conflicting and ambigu-
ous provisions cannot be otherwise resolved, the construction most
favorable to the party not the author of the document will be
chosen 5). However, there are many situations where the contractor
must necessarily admit that he knew of the discrepancy but that he
failed to tell the contracting officer promptly. In such cases, he be-
comes automatically bound by the method which he followed, and
where this proves more expensive than performing the work in
accordance with the other possible choices, his failure to give the
required notice of discrepancy would result in his incurring a sub-
stantial loss. This notice provision is substantially fair, because it
requires the contractor to inform the contracting officer only of
known discrepancies. If the contractor were permitted to proceed
without giving notice, his action could prevent the government from
selecting the best or the least expensive method of construction.
The contract provision does not require the notice to be written, but
it requires the contracting officer to make a determination in writing
probably impose additional requirements for notice in the general or special condi-
tions or technical provisions of the contract.
4. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, el. 2, "Specifications and Drawings."
5. See, e.g., Garrison v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 688 (1868).
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after he has received the notice. A prudent contractor would, of
course, notify the contracting officer in writing to avoid any later
misunderstanding as to the fact and time of the notice.
II. CHANGES
By written order the contracting officer may, within the general
scope of the contract, make changes both in the drawings and speci-
fications. However, if the changes so require, he must make an equi-
table adjustment in the contract price or time. "Any claim of the
contractor for adjustment under this clause must be asserted in writ-
ing within 30 days from the date of receipt . . . of the notification
of change."0
This requirement for a claim within thirty days, while seemingly
a simple demand, has been the basis for many disputes. The situa-
tion where a contracting officer, fully recognizing that his action
constitutes a change, directs the contractor to perform the work in
an altered manner, seldom gives rise to notice problems. Even where
the contracting officer's determination of what constitutes an equit-
able adjustment is not acceptable to the contractor, there are
few problems, since the contractor ordinarily records his protest
promptly.
If, however, the contracting officer does not recognize the order
as a change- such as, for example, an order necessitated by a dis-
agreement between the parties concerning the interpretation of a
specification requirement -or if he makes only an oral order, prob-
lems often arise. The last sentence of clause 3 of the Construction
Contract, Standard Form 23A, provides as follows: "Except as other-
wise herein provided, no charge for any additional work or material
will be allowed." Thus, with the exception of the "Changed Condi-
tions" clause and a few other provisions which have an even more
limited and specific application, claims for additional payment under
the contract must be based on clause 3, "Changes."
In the case of an oral order by the contracting officer or his repre-
sentative, the ensuing rights of the parties are not entirely clear.
Clause 3 permits changes only "by a written order." In practice,
however, oral orders sometimes are issued, and are acted upon by
contractors. More often than not, these arise out of conflicts of opin-
ion as to the contract requirements for a particular aspect of the
work, but this situation does not constitute all the cases.
The Army Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals has
squarely held that where the contracting officer denies that a change
6. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, cl. 3, "Changes."
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was ordered, he cannot rely on the contractor's failure to present a
claim or a protest within the thirty-day period to deny a subse-
quent claim by the contractor The Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals seems to be in accord with this position.8 Both boards
apply the rule not only where the contracting officer denies that any
order, oral or written, was issued' but also where a written docu-
ment is issued which the contracting officer contends was less than
a modification of the contract, such as, for example, where the con-
tracting officer's decision on a disputed interpretation of a specifica-
tion is reduced to writing.'1
The reasoning of the Army Corps of Engineers Contract Appeals
Board is based upon the wording of the clause that "any claim.
for adjustment must be asserted in writing within 30 days
which it interprets to mean that the contractor must protest the
adjustment contained in (or omitted from) the written order.
Therefore, if the government denies that there was an order in writ-
ing, it cannot rely upon the contractor's failure to protest within
thirty days. Literally taken, the above cases apparently eliminate
the need for filing a claim or protest within thirty days, except
where the contractor is dissatisfied with the equitable adjustment (or
omission of the same) proposed in a recognized change order.
Temporarily excluding consideration of the effect of the thirty-
day rule, whether a contractor can collect for performance of an
oral change order is itself a questionable proposition of government-
contract law. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Plum-
ley case, denied the contractor recovery, stating: "[Y]et Plumley
cannot recover for that which, though extra, was not ordered by the
officer and in the manner required by the contract."" Although it is
outside the scope of this Article to analyze in detail the decisions
involving oral orders, one can observe at least that the Court of
7. Fuel Economy Eng'r Co., Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals No.
1511 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Eng. BCA]; Con Structors, Eng. BCA
No. 590 (1954).
8. Todd Shipyards Corp., Armed Services BCA Nos. 2911, 2912 [hereinafter
referred to as ASBCA], 6 Contract Cases Federal 62, 126 (1957) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as C.C.F.]. But cf. Shepherd, War Dep't BCA No. 857, 4 C.C.F. 60,
116 (1946) (references in report are to "alleged changes," implying that the gov-
ernment denied that changes were actually ordered).
9. See Fuel Economy Eng'r Co., Eng. BCA No. 1511 (1959); Con Structors,
Eng. BCA No. 590 (1954).
10. Con Structors, Eng. BCA Nos. 911, 912 (Serial No. 1) (1958). But see
Hagstrom Constr. Co., Eng. BCA No. 1213 (1957), a decision of the same board
sustaining the right of the contracting officer to reject a claim because of failure
to assert a claim within thirty days, in a case where actions by the government upon
which the claim was based were not considered to be changes by the government
at the time.
11. Plumley v. United States, 226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913).
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Claims has sometimes allowed 12 and sometimes denied 13 contrac-
tors' claims predicated on oral orders. Considering the various court
and board decisions, contractors have probably prevailed more of-
ten than the government when the issue has been litigated; how-
ever, it is by no means a universally accepted proposition that a
contractor should be allowed to recover on an oral order where
there is a specific requirement for an order in writing. 4 In any
event, the Court of Claims has consistently emphasized the con-
tractor's obligation to present a timely protest. For instance in J. A.
Ross & Co. v. United States, the court said:
But even if defendant had given plaintiff a direct command to place this
material on this soggy ground, and even if this was in violation of the
contract, there is no proof that plaintiff registered any protest against doing
so. In the absence of a protest, we do not think plaintiff is entitled to
recover. Whenever the defendant orders work done which the plaintiff
thinks is in violation of the contract, or in addition to its requirements,
plaintiff is required to protest against doing it, or to secure an order in
writing before doing it. It is basic in all Government contracts that the
plaintiff cannot do work which it is not required to do by the contract,
without registering a protest against being required to do it, or securing
an order for extra work, and then later make a claim against the Govern-
ment for additional compensation. 15
The "Changes" clause permits a contracting officer to receive,
consider, and adjust a claim presented more than thirty days after
the notification of change, "if he determines that the facts justify
such action." The Court of Claims has held that a contracting offi-
cer's denial of a claim on its merits constitutes a waiver of his right
to later assert that the claim was not timely. 6 But the War Depart-
ment Board of Contract Appeals held that a contracting officer's dis-
cretion in determining whether he should receive and consider a
claim presented more than thirty days after receipt of notification of
change is limited to those cases where it is shown that his ability to
investigate and decide upon the claim has been prejudiced by the
contractor's failure to file a timely claim.' 7
This principle has been justified on the basis that an appeals
board, as representative of the head of the department, is the ad-
ministrative superior of the contracting officer (as well as the arbiter
of contract disputes), and can substitute its own judgment for that
12. Stiers v. United States, 121 Ct. CI. 157 (1951); Griffiths v. United States, 77
Ct. Cl. 542 (1938).
13. Globe Indem. Co. v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 21 (1944); Diamond v. United
States, 98 Ct. Cl. 428 (1943); McGlone v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 507 (1942);
Hardwick v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 836 (1940).
14. See United States v. Cunningham, 125 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
15. 126 Ct. Cl. 323, 329 (1953).
16. Arundel Corp. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 77 (1942).
17. Sanders, War Dep't BCA No. 955, 3 C.C.F. 862 & 923 (1945).
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of the contracting officer in determining whether the facts justified
the contracting officer's waiving the requirement for timely notice.
However, the provision does not mention a showing of prejudice
and indicates that the waiver is discretionary with the contracting
officer. In construing other contract provisions, appeals boards have
held that they cannot review the discretionary act of a contracting
officer.18 Despite the erosive effect of the various decisions on the
contracting officer's right to refuse to consider a claim where timely
notice has not been given, a prudent contractor will nevertheless
present his claim within the thirty-day period, for the Court of
Claims and appeals boards have, on occasion, fully supported con-
tracting officers who have refused to consider claims asserted after
expiration of the specified period.19
Most government construction contracts are complex documents,
and questions frequently arise during the course of performance
about the quality or type of work required by a particular specifica-
tion. A government inspector may order the contractor to stop, on
the ground that he is not proceeding with the work according to the
specifications, and may require him to adopt a procedure or use a
material in accordance with the inspector's interpretation of the con-
tract requirements. This, if the contractor is correct in his under-
standing of the requirements, would constitute a change. Therefore,
if he disagrees with the inspector, at this point the contractor should
request a determination in writing by the contracting officer or his
representative having authority to issue changes of the type indi-
cated. 0 The contracting officer's letter setting forth his interpreta-
tion and directing the contractor to proceed in accordance with that
interpretation would constitute the "order in writing" mentioned in
the "Changes" clause, and the contractor would then be in a position
to file a claim within thirty days. This procedure is consistent with
the provision of the "Changes" clause that no charge for any ex-
tra work or material will be allowed except as "otherwise herein
provided."
A contractor is under no compulsion to comply with an oral
change order. And contractors who refuse to proceed without the
issuance of an order in writing will not normally incur the displeas-
18. Homogenette, Inc., ASBCA No. 3856, 57-2 Board of Contract Appeals Deci-
sions 1469 (1957) [hereinafter referred to as B.C.A.D.].
19. J. A. Ross & Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 323 (1953); W. C. Shepherd
Co. v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 724, 817 (1953). The circumstances of these cases
do not lend themselves to the theory that the orders upon which the claims were
predicated were recognized by the contracting officer as changes or extras at the time
the orders were issued and, therefore, do not seem to support the position taken by
some boards, (see, for example, the cases cited in notes 7-10 supra) that the con-
tractor need not file a claim within thirty days if the government denies that a
change was ordered in writing.
20. Inspectors usually have no authority to make changes.
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ure of the contracting officer. To the contrary, they will facilitate
the orderly administration of the contract, and protect their own
substantive rights under the contract. Therefore, a contractor acts
most wisely by refusing to proceed with work which he considers
outside the requirements of the contract, until he receives an order
in writing from the contracting officer or a representative having au-
thority to issue such orders. Also, from a practical viewpoint, presen-
tation of a timely claim or protest is advantageous to the contractor.
Obviously, his problems in sustaining the burden of proof of his claim
increase as time passes. Timely notice should also insure prompt
handling of the claim. And in a dispute involving a contract inter-
pretation, the contractor's course of conduct at the time the matter
arose is usually considered relevant in determining the most reason-
able construction of the contract. His failure to manifest disagree-
ment with the government's interpretation at the time the problem
arises is at least some evidence that the government's interpretation
of the ambiguous or conflicting provision is correct.
III. CHANGED CONDrIONS
If the contractor encounters physical conditions which he consid-
ers to be within the purview of the "Changed Conditions" clause, he
must give the contracting officer written notice "promptly and be-
fore such conditions are disturbed." The clause further provides that
"any claim of the contractor for adjustment hereunder shall not be
allowed unless he has given notice as above required. ... ." How-
ever, as under the "Changes" clause, the contracting officer may, if
he determines the facts so justify, consider and adjust the claim even
though the required notice is not given.21
Notice of changed conditions is both an important and a reason-
able requirement. The contractor's notice may initiate courses of
action only indirectly related to performance of the particular con-
tract. For example, investigation of the conditions may indicate
that continuance of the contract work is no longer feasible. Proba-
bly more often than not, the discovery of an actual changed condi-
tion leads to an extensive modification of the contract to contend
with the unexpected conditions. In that case the adjustment of the
contract price will not be made under the "Changed Conditions"
clause but under the "Changes" clause, since the contractor will not
have had to cope with the adverse conditions. In any event, notice of
changed conditions provides the government an opportunity to
promptly investigate the conditions and to offer advice aimed at
mitigating the contractor's increased costs.
21. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, cl. 4, "Changed Conditions."
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The requirement for notice is absolute, and failure of the contrac-
tor to give the notice would seem to bar him from recovery, unless
the contracting officer, in his discretion, decided to receive and con-
sider the claim. However, the present standard "Changed Condi-
tions" clause, which has been in effect since 1953, has seldom been
construed in regard to this issue. Older clauses did not require writ-
ten notice; and they required the contracting officer to make an ad-
justment if the contractor encountered, or the government discov-
ered, changed conditions. 2 Some of the cases under the old clauses
held that an oral notice was sufficient and that the contracting
officer could not bar the contractor from recovery for failure to give
notice, if his own representative at the site knew of the conditions,
but of course these cases are of dubious application now. Obviously,
the present wording of the "Changed Conditions" clause leaves sub-
stantially less in the way of opportunity for watering down of the
notice requirement than does the "Changes" clause.
IV. Tvim EXTENSIONS
If the contractor encounters delays due to circumstances which
would entitle him to a time extension, he is required to notify the
contracting officer in writing of the causes of delay within ten days
from the beginning of the delay, "unless the contracting officer shall
grant a further period of time."2 3
Under certain circumstances, however, the appeals boards have
held that a contractor is not precluded from being granted a time ex-
tension by his failure to give notice within the ten-day period. It is
sometimes said that the contractor does not have to give notice if the
delay is known by the government; however, this statement is much
too broad. Actually, the better view is that failure to give notice
will be excused if notice would have served no useful purpose.
In obligating himself under a government contract, a contractor
deals with one agency of the government. Often, however, the agen-
cy administering the contract differs from the agency in charge of
the installation where the contract work is performed. For example,
the Army Corps of Engineers administers contracts for construction
at United States Air Force installations. Therefore, a delay may be
caused by some action of the Air Force which is not within the con-
trol or knowledge of the Corps of Engineers personnel. Although
this is a situation which might well entitle the contractor to a time
extension, it is also a case where notice of the delay would serve the
22. There is no provision as such in the newer clause for discovery by the gov-
ernment.
23. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, cl. 5, "Termination for Default-
Damages for Delay-Time Extensions."
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intended purposes of apprising the contracting officer of the delay
and of giving him an opportunity to remove the cause. Similarly, the
contractor may be delayed by the defense priorities and allocations
system. Although this is a delay caused by the "government," and
one which might entitle the contractor to a time extension, the
scope and cause of the delay are usually unknown to the contracting
officer, and the contractor is in the best position to evaluate the de-
lay and enlist the contracting officer's aid in expediting deliveries of
his materials.
Even when the delay is in the contracting officer's own bailiwick,
notice of the delay often should be given. Where, for example, the
contractor is delayed by failure of the government to approve shop
drawings, he should notify the contracting officer, because the effect
of failure to receive approved shop drawings is a matter usually
within the peculiar knowledge of the contractor. Again, if the con-
tracting officer knows that the particular approval is delaying the
contractor, he is in a position to alleviate the delay by expediting
the shop-drawing approval.
The decisions of the various boards may not always support the
above conclusions, however, because there is a tendency to refrain
from penalizing the contractor when the government is at least as
culpable as the contractor. But from a practical viewpoint, the prac-
tice of giving notice, whenever delayed, for whatever cause, will not
only insure preservation of the contractor's rights but also remove
the source of many delays.2 4
V. FoRm AisD SCOPE OF NOTICE
All of the notice provisions previously discussed are required to be
given to the "contracting officer." Since the contracting officer may
be hundreds of miles from the construction site, valid notice may
generally be given to the government officer at the site who is in
charge of the particular project. Some contracting officers have
adopted the desirable practice of issuing a letter at the time of mak-
ing the contract designating the person or persons who are author-
ized to receive notice. Probably the notice should be addressed to
the contracting officer and routed through the project, resident, or
area engineer. However, it is doubtful that any contractor would be
held to have failed to give the required notice if he addressed and
delivered it to the senior representative of the government at the
site.
24. Often the contracting officer and the project engineer at the site are con-
cerned with the simultaneous administration of many contracts. While there are some
instances where the delaying effect of governmental action on a particular contract
is readily observable, there are many occasions where government personnel have
no way of knowing of the delay. In almost every case, only the contractor can
accurately assess the projected adverse effect.
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With the exception of the notice of discrepancies required under
the "Specifications and Drawings" clause,25 the notices discussed in
this Article are required to be made in writing. And although
there is no requirement for the use of certified or registered mail,
obviously any argument pertaining to receipt or timeliness of notice
would be foreclosed by use of the special-handling mails. There is
no requirement for notice in any particular form. An ordinary busi-
ness letter signed by the person in the contractor's organization who
is supervising the work at the site is the generally accepted mode for
giving notice.
The letter should, of course, describe the circumstances in suffi-
cient detail to facilitate an intelligent investigation. If the notice in-
volves a request for additional compensation, there is no require-
ment that the original notice specify the exact amount claimed, so
long as the contractor states that he expects the contract price to be
adjusted commensurate with the increased work. Claims are often
carried through the entire dispute procedure to the final adminis-
trative board without the monetary amount ever having been af-
fixed. This procedure often proves convenient to both parties, since
computation of the exact amount owed to the contractor may be
made with facility once it is determined that he is entitled to any
adjustment at all.
Although appeals boards and courts have sometimes referred to
the "Changes" clause as requiring either a claim or "protest," the
clause, in fact, refers only to a claim. Therefore, it is advisable for
a contractor to phrase his notice under that clause in terms which
indicate not only that he protests the action of the contracting
officer but also that he considers this to be a situation entitling him
to additional compensation.
The "Changed Conditions" clause does not require the initial
notice to be in the form of a claim. If the notice is given "promptly,
and before such conditions are disturbed . ..," the basis for a
claim will not yet have arisen. However, the notice should de-
scribe with particularity and in detail the location of the problem
area. Moreover, it should fairly extensively compare the actual con-
ditions with those which might reasonably have been anticipated
from the contract documents. This information is necessary in order
for the contracting officer to proceed with his obligation to investi-
gate the conditions.
VI. NoTIcE OF APPEAL
No discussion of the requirements for notice under government
25. As previously mentioned in this Article, there was no mention of written
notice in connection with changed conditions in the former clause.
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contracts would be complete without mentioning the appeal re-
quired under the "Disputes" clause. However, since the disputes
procedure has already been analyzed commendably in other legal
journals,26 it will not be discussed in detail here.
The "Disputes" clause provides that the contracting officer's de-
cision shall become final and conclusive, unless "within 30 days
from the date of receipt of the decision the contractor mails or
otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal
addressed to the Secretary." 27 The contracting officer's decision,
with regard to questions of fact, becomes binding in the absence
of an appeal within the thirty-day period, and the contractor can-
not obtain further consideration of his claim. Moreover, contrary
to the situations discussed previously, the appeals boards and courts
-have allowed little deviation from the literal requirement that the
appeal be filed within the thirty-day period. Cases in which a
contractor has prevailed despite an apparent failure to appeal
within thirty days have usually been limited to situations where
the board has held that the decision in question was not a "final"
decision of the contracting officer, or that a letter or other docu-
ment delivered during the period actually was an appeal although
not purported to be one.
A line of decisions of the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals establishes one interesting exception to the rule with regard
to supply contracts. If a contractor's right to proceed with the
contract is terminated for default, two final decisions are involved.
The contracting officer first issues a notice of termination followed
sometime later by an assessment of the excess costs arising out of
the termination. The Board now holds that, despite the fact that
the contractor did not appeal from the notice of termination, he
still may contest the issue of whether his failure to perform was
excusable, if he makes a timely appeal from the assessment of
costs.29 The Board had previously held that the contractor could
26. See, for example, Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey
of Court and Administrative Decisions, 25 Fo SAm L. REv. 11 (1956).
27. Construction Contract, Standard Form 23A, cl. 6, "Disputes." Some variation
of the standard clause by the several departments is permitted, and the wording
should be checked. For example, Corps of Engineers contracts provide for an inter-
mediate appeal to the Chief of Engineers in the case of military works contracts. In
civil works contracts, the Chief of Engineers is the final administrative appellate
authority.
28. Allied Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 4873, 58-2 B.C.A.D. 2026 (1958).
29. Peterson, ASBCA No. 1633, 57-2 B.C.A.D. 1474 (1957); Homogenette, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 3856, 57-2 B.C.A.D. 1469 (1957); Fulford, ASBCA Nos. 2143, 2144,
6 C.C.F. 61, 815 (1955). In Virginia Dare Extract Co., ASBCA No. 4916 (1959), the
Board indicated that a contractor who appeals only the decision regarding assessment
of costs can subsequently raise the question of whether his failure to perform was
excusable. However, he cannot challenge the conclusion that he failed to make a
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question only the reasonableness of the assessment of costs if he
failed to appeal the decision terminating his right to proceed. The
change is apparently based upon a revision in the wording of the
supply contract termination clause, and it is doubtful that the rule
can be applied to construction contracts.
Although the rules of the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals and of the Army Corps of Engineers Board of Contract
Appeals prescribe forms for the submission of appeals, it appears
clear that a contractor will preserve his rights insofar as the time-
liness of the appeal is concerned by simply filing within the thirty-
day period a clear statement expressing an unequivocal present
intention to appeal.30 However, the Department of Interior Board
of Contract Appeals appears to be less lenient in this respect.31
SUMMARY
The desirability of giving adequate notice pursuant to the terms
of the government construction contract is apparent when one re-
alizes that the primary reason for requiring notice is to inform the
contracting officer that the contractor thinks he has encountered
a situation which may entitle him to extra payment or additional
time within which to accomplish the work. Since notice usually
includes or precedes the contractor's request for additional money
or a time extension, and since he is nearly always in the best posi-
tion to discover the situation and assess its effect on his operations,
it is reasonable to require him to give notice. Timely notice enables
the contracting officer to make a prompt investigation which is nec-
essary both to determine what course the construction work should
follow and to evaluate the equitable adjustment, if any, which must
be made in the contract price and time for performance.
timely delivery or that the supplies delivered failed to meet specifications, unless he
appeals the decision terminating his contract.
30. New York Eng'r Co. ASBCA No. 289, 4 C.C.F. 60, 961 (1950).
31. Henkle & Co., Dep't of Interior BOA No. 212, 59-2 B.C.A.D. 2331 (1959).
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